Retired USDA Veterinarian Grades The Food Safety Inspection Service
By Laurel Maloy, contributing writer, Food Online
Dr. Michael Fisher gave 30 years of service to the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Upon his retirement, he speaks honestly about the Food Safety Inspection Service’s past history and present-day processes
Though his 30-year career with the USDA has come to an end, Dr. Michael Fisher is following Dylan Thomas’ advice and will “not go gentle into that good night.” Obviously passionate about his work at the USDA’s Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS), he is embarking on another career as a consultant for food safety.
Fisher plainly admits that his first year on the job was “not fun.” In his second year, he gained a new insight, along with a new mentor, and started enjoying his job. His mentor, Dr. H (his name was withheld to protect his identity), “taught me how to be hard on problems and soft on people.” Fisher has graded what he believes are the six key issues that occupied the majority of his time and energy:
HAACP — for its implementation of Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HAACP), FSIS gets a C. Fisher cites 9 CFR 416 and 417 as “the most significant change to meat and poultry inspection since the Wholesome Meat and Poultry Products Acts (enacted in 1968 for Meat and in 1969 for Poultry) regulating state inspection programs)” 9 CFR is Title 9 of the Federal Code of Regulations regulating Animals and Animal Products. He says it was an exciting time and one he considered a “potential renaissance”. However, he also makes clear that FSIS did not make the most of it. Fisher advises FSIS to stop avoiding issues until a third party makes them public, what Fisher is calling, “management by avoidance,” and says the agency should more rigidly apply its own inspection processes, as mandated by HACCP.
Pathogen Control Programs — Fisher also gives the FSIS a C for its pathogen control programs. He gives FSIS kudos for its response to the 1993 E. coli outbreak, which resulted in “safe handling” statements on raw meat packaging. He also praises the agency for elevating the E. coli standards and introducing product verification testing. Gratifying and valuable Listeria monocytogene policies followed. Fisher, however, lambasts FSIS for its Salmonella procedures and policies. For example, in 1974, FSIS argued successfully in Federal Court that raw poultry is not adulterated by Salmonella. The agency did the same in 2001, but with raw meat. Fisher suggests that though no one wants Salmonella on raw meat or poultry, perpetuating the public’s perception of a regulatory Salmonella performance standard is a waste of money. According to Fisher, it doesn’t exist; it cannot be regulated. He urges transparency by saying, “Attempting to regulate as a food safety hazard is as fruitless as pounding square pegs in round holes.”
Humane Slaughter Program — FSIS also gets a C for this program. Fisher explains that the animal rights movement has effectively co-opted FSIS; only the fear of unfavorable press drives the humane handling agenda. As a result, there is a public perception of inhumane slaughter of poultry, which Fisher maintains is nonexistent, though a few other inhumane practices have been proven. Additionally, as of 2002, there is now a District Veterinary Medical Specialist (DVMS), where none used to exist. In fact, there is now a DVMS for each of 10 districts of the USDA, with a salary range of $88.693.00 to $115,301.00 per year. This amounts to an annual expenditure of well over $1 million when figuring benefits and overhead into the package. Could this money be better utilized to train existing inspectors or hire additional ones?
Data Collection — “FSIS struggles with the fact that its data-collection efforts cannot validate its strategic plan,” states Fisher, as he gives them a D on this aspect of the agency’s performance. He calls the series of data collection plans “little more than scheduling tools.” He talks further about FSIS’ abandonment of its Public Health Human Resources System after managers failed to implement the system properly. The program’s design was meant to increase performance, but its improper implementation negated its justification. FSIS needs a user-friendly statistical tool by which to measure forward progress.
Training Programs — FSIS gets a B from Fisher here. Since he first arrived at the USDA, the training center has moved to Texas A&M. Scholastic standards and field training has significantly improved, while the entire program continues on a better course. New veterinarian hires no longer arrive at their first assignment alone and unprepared, as he did. Fisher, does however, cite the absence of training support from the Office of Policy and Program Development (OPPD) as the reason for not giving its training programs a higher grade.
Residue Program — Finally, Fisher hands out an A! At one time, in-plant testing was nonexistent, Supervisory Veterinary Medical Officer-(SVMO) generated samples were almost unheard of, and the condemnation of carcasses extremely rare. According to Fisher, “No other FSIS program is as successful at finding and eliminating adulterated product.” He stops short, though of patting FSIS on the back. He gives credit instead to Dr. S (name also withheld), an SVMO whose due diligence enabled him to prove that the old program failed to identify residue violations in dairy cattle.